Rohingya in India

India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and has no dedicated domestic asylum law. Every non-citizen without a valid passport and visa is classified as an "illegal migrant" under the Foreigners Act (1946), the Passport (Entry into India) Act (1920), and the Passports Act (1967). [H1]

UNHCR operates a New Delhi office that conducts its own refugee status determination and issues identity cards, but the Union Government explicitly does not recognize these cards as conferring any right to enter, reside, or remain in the country. Long-Term Visas that were once issued to some displaced groups stopped being renewed for Rohingya around 2016 to 2017. [H1,L4]

To enforce removal, the Ministry of Home Affairs directs state governments to run district-level Special Task Forces, and captures biometric data, fingerprints, facial scans, and iris scans, through the Foreigners Identification Portal. Undocumented Rohingya are held in dedicated facilities such as the Hiranagar Sub-Jail in Jammu and the Matia Transit Camp in Assam under Section 3(2)(e) of the Foreigners Act, often for indefinite periods without formal charges. [L3,L4]

In Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India (2021), the Supreme Court declined to block the detention or deportation of Rohingya held in Jammu. The Court held that while the right to life under Article 21 extends to non-citizens, the right to reside and settle under Article 19(1)(e) applies only to Indian citizens, leaving the executive free to proceed with removals under the Foreigners Act. [L5]

Forced returns have followed. In May 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Indian authorities expelled scores of Rohingya to Bangladesh and Myanmar, including one incident in which 40 detained refugees were put on a naval vessel and made to swim ashore on the Myanmar coast. [L1]

Access to India's Public Distribution System and the National Food Security Act's subsidized grain requires an Aadhaar-linked ration card, a credential Rohingya cannot obtain, which excludes the community from state food assistance entirely. [H4]

What relief exists comes from private charity. In Delhi, the Zakat Foundation of India has provided land and building materials for the Madanpur Khadar settlement; in Hyderabad, the Hyderabad Zakat and Charitable Trust and the Salamah Trust distribute food, blankets, and winter clothing. [E3] UNHCR partners are legally limited to primary healthcare referrals, informal education support, and disaster relief. Survey data from informal settlements show widespread anemia and chronic child malnutrition tied to low income and irregular charity. [E2]

Housing is overwhelmingly makeshift: single-room jhuggis built from bamboo, tarpaulin, discarded timber, and corrugated metal, offering little protection from heatwaves, monsoon flooding, or winter cold. Combined with open-flame cooking and informal wiring, this makes fire a recurring hazard. Delhi's Madanpur Khadar settlement has recorded at least nine major fires since 2012, including one on June 12, 2021 that destroyed 53 shanties and left 230 refugees homeless. [E2]

Water access is acute: research in Madanpur Khadar found six-member households collecting only 30 to 40 litres of water a day for all cooking, drinking, and hygiene needs, well below basic international standards, drawn from irregular tankers or contaminated shallow groundwater. With little drainage or piped sewage, wastewater pools in unpaved lanes and open defecation remains common; field surveys found over 90% of women in these settlements report chronic urinary tract infections linked to poor sanitation. [E2]

Rohingya settlements sit under continuous monitoring by local police, state Anti-Terrorism Squads, and intelligence agencies, with routine nighttime headcounts and document checks. Mass arrest drives occur periodically: in July 2023, Uttar Pradesh's ATS arrested 74 Rohingya across multiple districts on allegations of illegal entry and document fraud. [L9]

Conditions inside detention have turned violent. In July 2023, refugees held at the Hiranagar Sub-Jail in Jammu began a hunger strike protesting indefinite confinement; security personnel responded with force and tear gas inside the enclosed facility, and a five-month-old infant died from teargas inhalation. [L9]

Political rhetoric that frames Rohingya as a national security threat and demographic risk has fed local hostility, leaving the community exposed to harassment, vigilantism, and extortion by landlords and local actors who exploit their undocumented status. [E1]

Inter-state travel by rail or bus carries a real risk of interception: police checkpoints at major hubs demand proof of identity or local clearance, and anyone stopped without it can be detained under the Foreigners Act. [L3]

Digital exclusion runs just as deep. Buying or keeping a mobile SIM card requires Aadhaar-linked biometric verification, which Rohingya cannot obtain, so many rely on SIMs registered under acquaintances' names, risking sudden disconnection and cutting them off from relatives, online education, and emergency services. Commercial banks likewise require identity documents Rohingya do not have, pushing the community into a fully cash-based informal economy vulnerable to theft and extortion. [E2]

Without work permits or recognized status, adults are confined to the lowest tiers of informal labor: ragpicking and scrap collection, daily-wage construction, brick-kiln work, factory labor, rickshaw pulling, street vending, and domestic service. Early arrivals in Jammu were subcontracted for manual excavation laying optical fiber cable. [E1]

Wage discrimination is systemic: employers routinely pay Rohingya workers less than Indian laborers for identical work, exploiting their fear of police involvement, and wage theft, contractors simply refusing payment after work is done, is a recurring complaint. Economic hardship combined with barriers to schooling pushes children into scrap-sorting and hawking alongside adults, reinforcing marginalization across generations. [E1,E8]

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act guarantees primary schooling to every child aged 6 to 14 in India, but government school admission systems require an Aadhaar card, a national student ID, a birth certificate, and a parent's bank account, documents Rohingya families do not have, so most children are turned away from state schools. Community learning is limited to informal NGO- or madrasa-run centers that offer basic literacy and religious instruction but no accredited progression pathway. [H4]

Public hospitals provide emergency care regardless of nationality, but routine and specialist treatment requires identity documents. Even the National TB Elimination Programme, which offers free testing and treatment, requires Aadhaar registration; field research in Jammu found Rohingya with active tuberculosis unable to access free state treatment for lack of Aadhaar, forcing many into costly private care or abandoning treatment altogether, a driver of continued community transmission. Language barriers, with few health workers speaking Chittagonian, Rohingya, or Burmese, compound the problem. [E5,E4]

The Government of India's position, set out in parliamentary answers and court filings, centers on sovereignty and security: undocumented Rohingya are said to enter through clandestine channels, strain infrastructure, and pose a risk given suspected links to transnational networks, and since India is not bound by the 1951 Convention, officials argue it has no legal obligation to recognize UNHCR cards or grant asylum, only to detect, detain, and deport under the Foreigners Act. [L2]

Human rights organizations and UNHCR counter that this approach breaches the customary international-law principle of non-refoulement, which bars returning people to places where they face persecution or death, and argue that indefinite detention without due process, built on anti-Muslim political rhetoric, violates rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, treaties India has joined. [L1,L4]

Rohingya community members describe their presence in India as a matter of survival rather than a bid for permanent settlement, saying they seek safety and dignity while conditions in Myanmar remain unsafe, and that they would return voluntarily to Rakhine State once their citizenship and basic rights are restored. [E1]